Chapter 6: Tolerance without Resentment
The Buddha said, “When a malicious person hears about
goodness and intentionally comes to provoke trouble, you should
restrain yourself; do not be angry or reprimand him. Evil deeds
will fall back upon the evil-doer.”
-- The Sutra of Forty-Two Chapters
Going about my business, listening to The Phenomenology of Spirit by Georg Wilhelm Hegel, I hear the words "In the void, nothing is known."
And I am intrigued.
Does it suggest that that in the void "nothing" is known? Or the opposite? That not-knowing is the essence of the void?
That not-knowing is most intimate?
Dizang asked Fayan, "Where are you going?"
Fayan said, "Around on pilgrimage."
Dizang said, "What is the purpose of pilgrimage?"
Fayan said, "I don't know."
Dizang said, "Not knowing is most intimate."
-- Zoketsu Norman Fischer
https://everydayzen.org/teachings/not-knowing-is-most-intimate/
Weary of the blah, blah, blah of the cultural/political instigations and posturing of the majority of DC provocateurs, I content myself with denser diversion and intellectually intriguing possibilities in philosophy and spirituality. I prefer my own unintelligible investigation.
I find this paper:
Law entails its own inversion, Hegel tells us: the law of electricity necessitates its positivity and negativity together as one; the law of against murder entails the constituting the crime, the punishment, and the absence of murder as a positively existing condition, all together in one totality (Hegel 2018: 96).10 Hegel makes a very simple remark about this situation, one which we’ve already touched on. The beyond is the simple turning-away of immediate objective existence from itself. To say that the laws of the world are beyond the immediately sensible world says nothing else than that this immediate world possesses negativity within itself. Immediate objects automatically exclude us from them; further, they (the objects) posit a beyond that mediates the differentiation of themselves. The world immanently excludes itself from itself, positing a beyond of itself from within itself. Thus, this supersensible realm that I must by necessity presuppose is not negatively nothing. It is the positive nothing that belongs to the objective world as such; it is what Hegel calls the “void:”
in the void, nothing is known… because it is defined as the very other-worldly beyond of consciousness… Suppose we are nonetheless to take there to be something in the void after all; this is a void which came about as the void of objective things but which now must be taken both as emptiness in itself, or as the void of all spiritual relations, or even as the void of the differences of consciousness as consciousness – and if the void is taken as this complete void, which is also called the holy, nonetheless there is supposed to be something with which to fill it out, even if it is only filled out with daydreams, or with appearances which consciousness itself creates. If so, then consciousness would just have to rest content with being so badly treated, for it would deserve no better, while daydreams themselves are still better than its emptiness (Hegel 2018: 87). 11
The other-worldly-beyond of the understanding is just the negation of this understanding within the world. This amounts to everything we have already proposed: the understanding demands its own negation, its own exclusion. But, furthermore, it is the void of consciousness as positively determined in the structure of the objective world. The understanding is slowly approaching its act of self-exclusion, in terms of the self- exclusion of the world. The holy is the daydreaming of the understanding; the real existence of illusion in the world, the truth of which is the frozen night of the world, constitutive of consciousness as such. That emptiness which the understanding wants to fill its own errors with is the nullity of the world to itself. The understanding had to posit the supersensible world of law as the determining principle of its own experience, but the consequence is that the differentiation of objects in the world is the world differentiating itself and thereby explicitly determining the possibility of error, the partiality of objects according to their property-being or their thing-being.
(-- from Hegel's Understanding: Absence, Accident, Alienated by Virgil Lualhati McCorgray, University of Georgia, United States, in International Journal of Zizek Studies, Volume 15 Number 3)
Aristotle begins his Metaphysics with this:
"ALL men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things."
https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.1.i.html
And the question arises for me, is the desire to know a reluctance to not-know? If not-knowing is most intimate, is there a built-in avoidance of intimacy in our desire to know? Is the second noble truth -- “that suffering is caused by craving (or tanha), which includes desire, attachment, and aversion to sensory pleasures, existence, and non-existence" (AI) a clarification of a way of being that might be more advantageous to our human experience -- namely, to live without craving or desire is (paradoxically) a more radically desirous way of being for us?
Is desire itself different from desiring something? Is ignorance itself different from not knowing something?
A student I am working with is studying Śūnyatā.
In Buddhism, śūnyatā (Sanskrit for "emptiness") is the concept that all phenomena, including the self, lack inherent, independent existence and are instead interdependent and constantly changing. It doesn't mean "nothingness," but rather that things are empty of fixed, isolated reality, existing only in relation to causes and conditions. Understanding śūnyatā is a profound insight that leads to the cessation of suffering by freeing one from attachment and clinging. (AI)
As the world changes, I change. As I change -- does the world change?
Is attempting to know “other” -- is the desire to possess, manipulate, or occupy “the other” -- a formula for detached being, alienation, aloofness, and coldness?
Is intimacy authentic suffering? Is the icon of the Bodhisattva of compassion, the one who hears the cries of the world, an example of authentic suffering different from the artificial suffering of our personal desires?
Is desirelessness an entranceway to the type of suffering pointed to in the Christ story, in the Bodhisattva ideal wherein communion and community -- a mystical body incorporating and incarnating our nascent wholeness -- is a reality where nothing is known?
Where nothing is known . . . (with all the ambiguity and seeming contradictoriness involved) . . . is everything loved?
Is this why Buddha, Lao Tzu, and Jesus are so difficult to comprehend and even more difficult to follow?
Is this why true and profound intimacy is such a strange notion to the ordinary way we view the world?