Abstract:
Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: Pauline Meontology and Lutheran Irony, by Duane Armitage
This paper argues that Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy is primarily an exercise in Pauline meontology informed by Luther’s fundamental posture of the irony of sola fide vis-à-vis the Mosaic Law. Heidegger comments on Paul’s meontology in the last section of his Phenomenology of Religious Life, where meontology concerns the messianic standpoint of regarding the world ‘as not’ (hos me), and in turn awaiting the coming ‘not-yet.’ Such is an outgrowth of the powerless enactment of faith, which I argue has its roots in Heidegger’s appropriation of Luther’s ‘ironic’ doctrine of sola fide – ironic in the Kierkegaardian sense of ‘infinite absolute negativity’ directed against the whole of existence. Moreover, I claim this ironic, meontological standpoint is essential for interpreting Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, for Contributions concerns the overcoming of metaphysics by recognizing the ironic-concealing nature of beyng (Seyn). Meontology is ironic in its negating, but beyng itself also proves essentially ironic in its continual refusal as the truth-process of ‘clearing-concealment’ (lichtende Verbergung). Dasein is called to grasp this ironic dimension of beyng qua truth. Yet, in Contributions, Heidegger calls such peculiar grasping, or ‘standing in the truth,’ faith itself. It is precisely this understanding of ironic faith that, I argue, mirrors Luther’s doctrine of sola fide.
Publication Name: The Heythrop Journal Research Interests: Phenomenology, Continental Philosophy, and Martin Heidegger
https://www.academia.edu/7234071/Heidegger_s_Contributions_to_Philosophy_Pauline_Meontology_and_Lutheran_Irony
Excerpt:
For Kierkegaard, irony is characterized by a distance and difference between essence and appearance. Essence and appearance exist in a tension whereby appearance reveals not its essence but the opposite thereof. Irony is simply the tension between word and meaning that results in the spoken word signifying the opposite of what it normally intends. One means, not what one says, but rather the opposite. Real irony for Kierkegaard hides its meaning from its observers allowing for the ironist to have a sort of ‘negative freedom’ through lack of commitment to a meaning. That is, when what is said means neither literally what is said nor the opposite, the ironist experiences a freedom in the very negation of meaning. In other words, in irony meaning is always held back and concealed, and it is done so precisely by what is said. Irony involves a hiding and a concealing in the very act of saying. The ironist floats above meaning precisely because his speech holds back; it is this act of holding back that constitutes the negation, namely irony’s negation of essence.
(--Duane Armitage, Gonzaga University)
For Kierkegaard, irony is characterized by a distance and difference between essence and appearance. Essence and appearance exist in a tension whereby appearance reveals not its essence but the opposite thereof. Irony is simply the tension between word and meaning that results in the spoken word signifying the opposite of what it normally intends. One means, not what one says, but rather the opposite. Real irony for Kierkegaard hides its meaning from its observers allowing for the ironist to have a sort of ‘negative freedom’ through lack of commitment to a meaning. That is, when what is said means neither literally what is said nor the opposite, the ironist experiences a freedom in the very negation of meaning. In other words, in irony meaning is always held back and concealed, and it is done so precisely by what is said. Irony involves a hiding and a concealing in the very act of saying. The ironist floats above meaning precisely because his speech holds back; it is this act of holding back that constitutes the negation, namely irony’s negation of essence.
(--Duane Armitage, Gonzaga University)