When is relationality no longer relationality but reality-itself formerly known by concepts no longer sustainable by thought?
A question of presuppositions, I suppose? Postmodernity and the ‘Return of Religion’
Caputo is often aligned to what today is called postsecularism, the awareness that after secularization religion has not been banned from the world at all. On the contrary, postsecularists argue, whereas the traditional theory of secularization suspected the complete downfall of religion at least in industrial and urbanized societies, a return of religion is to be noted even in those civilized circles consisting of religion’s former despisers. This section will show just how this postsecular world takes shape for Caputo. Modernity, and enlightened thought in general, falls prey to its own excesses. It is far from difficult to come up with a few examples of all this: an overestimation of rationality, a craving for progress at all costs, etc. Caputo names the following, from a more philosophical perspective: “Good riddance to the idea of pure wordless and solipsistic subjects, to the ideal of pure presuppositions to science, to a pure prelinguistic world, to pure objects, to pure consciousness, and to pure reason”.1
The Enlightenment, and its call to freedom and autonomy, may in effect have turned rather soon to a new form of oppression—‘thou shalt not be irrational’—a fate which it obviously shares with many revolutions. The search for pure reason soon became as dogmatic as the religion it rejected. The quest for the ‘conditions of possibility of knowledge’, knew in the end very little: the one thing it could be certain of was the object, of which it could configure the geometrical coordinates in a clear and distinct manner; it, of course, knew of the human being—the subject who knew the object—but this being was perhaps already on the verge of losing its humanity if only because it was expected to prescribe to the world its being in a stable, permanent and unaltered way. The transcendental subject, Lacoste writes, is nothing less than a monster and the illusion of autonomy, of a being unrelated to any other being if only with itself, has fortunately been overturned. Yet we know that this critique of the Enlightenment, this “New Enlightenment, one that is enlightened about the limits of the old one”2 all too readily reverses in its counterposition. One might for instance think of the idea of relationality: if the desire for autonomy is abandoned because it too easily turns into a bloodless, lifeless and worldless monadic monster then this ‘new’ Enlightenment all too easily opts for the contrary and posits the dream of a total openness of one subject to another—I am nothing without my network and my relations—which, in the best of all possible worlds, would of course be accompanied with a complete openness of the other toward myself. If the reference to the world of managers and business is perhaps not to be interpreted as a coincidence, the philosophical point about this reversal is nevertheless more important: one can indeed legitimately wonder whether this dream of total openness not simply repeats the old, metaphysical idea of adequatio, of a correspondence of thought with the matter at hand, of a clear and no less distinct idea of this matter on another level, for this correspondence may well no longer lie in a relation-less subject (relating everything that is to itself) but now rather lies in the dream of an adequate—since total—openness, ‘between’ subjects (relating to one another and, through, this to everything else).3 Just as the causa sui, in the old days, was configured as the cause that caused everything else but remained itself uncaused, so it is easy to configure ‘God’ as the relation that instigates all the other relations but is not and cannot be related to itself—remember, for instance, that for Aquinas already, there is no ‘real relation’ between the world and God. The end of metaphysics? Are we there yet?
For Caputo, we are however well on our way to this ‘end’, if only through at times taking a step back. Caputo will in effect argue that there is an analogy between the precritical thought of the Middle Ages and postcritical postmodernity: it is not that we all of a sudden have relapsed in an age of obscurity (although some might like to see postmodernity in this way) in which faith is accorded a more primordial role than reason, it is rather that the postsecular account of deconstruction now notes that faith is not entirely bereft of reason just as reason does not seem to be entirely exempt of belief. In this way, deconstruction is held between premodern and modern thought: it does neither opt for blind faith without reason nor for a pure reason without faith but rather for a faith in and of rationality.
(—from, Holy Ignorance? John Caputo's Religion without Religion (Draft), by joeri schrijvers)
The course I took with John Caputo at Villanova was on Heidegger. It was the late seventies. He had just published (1978) The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (Ohio University Press).
Philosophy, poetry, and zen encircled me as I wandered an alternative country path.
Ein anderer Weg
see without knowing
know without seeing — now — this
faith/reason saunter
(wfh)




