Sometimes I'll look at one of the articles sent by Academia.edu. They are all worth the time and effort. Today a question of God and the question whether 'care' is a felt attribute.
Why do so many suffer? And why do so many not suffer? Is there some theological algorithm? Is there a karmic scale pointing to degrees of weight tilting one way or the other? Is it all just the luck of the draw? Good genes? Wealthy grandparents? A cosmic lottery spun and dropped into a sequence of numbers?
I have no idea. But I sent a small donation to St Judes last week. Kids with cancer is a tough one. Not all cases are sweet, happy, and successful. How is that? Why is that?
Evaluating Schellenberg’s Presuppositions in the Problem of Divine Hiddenness from an Islamic Perspective
--by Hamidreza Ayatollahy
Abstract:
At the end of the twentieth century, Schellenberg attempted to construct an argument for the non- existence of God. He emphasizes the necessity of the manifestation of divine love among people and argues that since many human beings find no trace of this love—despite having made great efforts and being willing to accept it sincerely if they were to find evidence—the existence of such non-resistant nonbelievers is itself evidence that such a God does not exist. Many have attempted either to challenge the structure of his argument or to provide justifications for why God has concealed Himself. However, in this paper, in order to evaluate Schellenberg’s claim, the presuppositions underlying his argument are identified, and an effort is made to examine these presuppositions within the framework of Islamic thought. Four presuppositions are discussed, and it is then shown that none of these four religious presuppositions has a place in Islamic thought such that Schellenberg could base his argument upon them. Consequently, these presuppositions cannot serve as premises for Schellenberg’s arguments, and thus the structure of his argument collapses when viewed from an Islamic perspective.
Introduction:
Atheistic currents have adopted a new approach since the beginning of the twentieth century. Until the early twentieth century, these currents either tried to provide reasons to show the inefficacy of various arguments that had been offered for the existence of God, or they questioned the reality of believers’ faith in God through psychological or sociological explanations (Ayatollahy, 2025). However, all these efforts resulted merely in agnosticism and skepticism regarding the existence of God. From the early twentieth century onward, instead of rejecting the arguments for God’s existence, these movements attempted to put forward arguments aimed at proving that God cannot exist or that no meaningful concept of God can be obtained at all. Their most important effort was made through the problem of evil (Mackie, 1955.)
They sought to show that the existence of evil in the world demonstrates an intrinsic contradiction in the concept of God as understood in theistic worldviews. Some also tried to draw such a conclusion from the apparent conflict between divine foreknowledge and human free will. However, philosophers such as Plantinga showed that the existence of evil is not logically incompatible with the attributes of God, and even demonstrated that the existence of evil may be a necessary condition for God’s creation of free human beings (Plantinga, 1974). Subsequently, the logical problem of evil gave way to the evidential problem of gratuitous evils, which was formulated by William Rowe (Rowe, 1979). This objection, too, was subjected to numerous critiques by theists. With the emergence of analytic philosophy of language, another type of objection was raised by opponents of theism, questioning the meaningfulness of religious propositions. This argument was formulated by Antony Flew in his famous parable of the two explorers and the invisible gardener.
Two explorers, during their journey, encounter a group of trees, and one of them claims that the grove is arranged and cared for by a wise gardener (just as God is explained in the world). The second explorer takes the absence of any observable gardener as evidence of his non-existence. He then shows that there is in practice no viable way to reveal such a gardener. Consequently, neither evidence for the existence of such a gardener nor evidence for his non-existence can be provided, and thus the claim of the gardener’s existence is meaningless. Basil Mitchell, Richard Hare, John Hick, and Crombie, in response, attempted to demonstrate the meaningfulness of belief in God in various ways. This objection has been presented in two forms (Flew et al., 1971). In the parable of the two explorers, Flew questions the existence of God, while in another parable he renders the attributes of the God of theists meaningless. He gives the example of a child suffering from cancer of the larynx, burning with fever, while his earthly father desperately tries all night long to save him. Yet no sign of the heavenly Father, who is said to be a God of love for His servants, is seen, and eventually the child dies (Flew in Hick, 1990, p. 368). Through this parable, he shows that the theistic claim that the heavenly God loves human beings is neither verifiable nor falsifiable, and concludes that this belief is fundamentally meaningless. After Flew, this example has been discussed less frequently (Ayatollahy, 2025).
The challenge of the alleged meaninglessness of God’s existence and of divine attributes was reformulated in a new structure by Schellenberg at the end of the twentieth century in order to present an argument against the existence of God. He analyzed the Christian doctrine of a loving God whose most important attribute is love for His servants. He argued that such a loving God necessarily seeks to be in relationship with His servants in such a way that they can understand this loving relationship. Yet under circumstances in which some human beings (at least) are in dire need of benefiting from the fruits of this love, they see no tangible sign of God’s love in their lives. He describes this issue as “divine hiddenness” (Schellenberg, 1993).
(An excerpt. --cf https://www.academia.edu/s/3808a7aa4f#comment_1495553 for whole article)
I played 'hide and seek' as a kid. After a while in a good hiding place I'd want to be found. I didn't want dusk to come and be forgotten. "Divine hiddenness" feels a familiar scenario. I'm not fond of the thought that God doesn't care. (If there is "a God" or "God-as-Reality.")
So many arguments seem an artifice of apologetics. The driver in a smashed automobile in the seconds following a sudden crash calls out to God to protect her children in the back seat. Of course she does. The desperate man with gun in hand sitting in living room at edge of inner debate whether now is the time to pull the trigger and erase (he thinks) his life, his pain, his tortured psyche.
It seems both facile and foolish to question whether there is a God who sees us, cares for us, and wishes to assist us in our difficult and critical moments.
These days I'm just as pleased to imagine there is a God who cares as I am to accept the possibility there is no God and, thus, no superseding being in control of existence and sentient life. I pray to a loving living God and, at the same time, I accept the raw fact we are on our own with no protection or home.
In days gone by we would kill the atheist. Or we would kill those who believed in a version of God different from the one "we" believed in. And then, curiously, we would quietly inch toward our self-generation as a version of God more to our ideological aspirations. Which is more dangerous is fodder for Talmudic or Tibetan or Inquisition debate.
Whether God's existence is meaningful or meaningless is, I suppose, something to think about.
I don't know.
Last night we talked about the word "stupid."
Certainly applies to me.
I look at myself in the world.
And the word "fool" comes to mind..
